GTRADE-001: Domain-Wide Delegation Org-Takeover Exposure
- Platform
- Google Workspace
- Category
- Adversary Tradecraft
- Severity
- Critical
- Zero Trust pillar
- Visibility & Analytics (weight 2)
- Golden fixtures
- 3
- Branch coverage
- Observed: fixtures prove the verdicts they exercise
- Provenance
- original
What it checks
Domain-wide delegation binds impersonation to a service account's OAuth client ID, not its key — so anyone who can mint a key on a delegated SA holding broad scopes gains org-wide impersonation without super admin (the DeleFriend technique). Delegated grants carrying full Gmail/Drive/Directory/cloud-platform scopes are the takeover precondition.
Recommended value
No service account delegated org-impersonation scopes (full Gmail/Drive/Directory/cloud-platform); narrow read-only scopes only
Remediation
Security > API controls > Domain-wide delegation: remove or narrow any grant holding full mail.google.com, full drive, admin.directory, or cloud-platform scopes; restrict to the minimum read-only scopes required. In GCP, deny key creation on delegated service accounts (iam.disableServiceAccountKeyCreation).
Fixture-proven verdicts
Every verdict below is proven by a golden fixture in the module's gating test suite. This table derives from the last green run; it cannot be edited by hand.
| Scenario | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| clean | PASS |
| known-bad | FAIL |
| throttled | Not Assessed |
Framework mappings
- NIST SP 800-53
- AC-6, IA-2, AC-6(5)
- CIS Benchmark
- 1.x
- MITRE ATT&CK
- T1078.004, T1098
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Guerrilla is free and open source. · Validation
Guerrilla is written and maintained by Jim Tyler. This copy lives on jimtyler.org; the project also publishes at guerrilla.army.